Summary
- The Minsk agreements of September 2014 and February 2015, which sought to end Russia’s war in eastern Ukraine, rest on two irreconcilable interpretations of Ukraine’s sovereignty – what could be called the ‘Minsk conundrum’: is Ukraine sovereign, as Ukrainians insist, or should its sovereignty be limited, as Russia demands?
- Ukraine sees the agreements as instruments with which to re-establish its sovereignty in line with the following sequence: a ceasefire; a Russian withdrawal from eastern Ukraine; return of the Russia/Ukraine border to Ukrainian control; free and fair elections in the Donbas region; and a limited devolution of power to Russia’s proxy regimes, which would be reintegrated and resubordinated to the authorities in Kyiv. Ukraine would be able to make its own domestic and foreign policy choices.
- Russia sees the Minsk agreements as tools with which to break Ukraine’s sovereignty. Its interpretation reverses key elements in the sequence of actions: elections in occupied Donbas would take place before Ukraine had reclaimed control of the border; this would be followed by comprehensive autonomy for Russia’s proxy regimes, crippling the central authorities in Kyiv. Ukraine would be unable to govern itself effectively or orient itself towards the West.
- These contradictory provisions are testimony to a stunning failure of Russian foreign policy. In 2014 Russia launched a campaign of violent subversion to compel Ukraine to ‘federalize’ its political system. Belying Russian expectations, Ukrainians fought back en masse, forcing Russia to resort to increasingly open military intervention. Russia inflicted crushing defeats on Ukrainian forces, yet was unwilling to pay the price that further high-intensity war would have exacted.
- Western views on how to implement the Minsk agreements are imprecise and inconsistent. One prevalent view is that implementation means finding a mid-point between the Russian and Ukrainian positions. However, attempts to do so have failed – heaping pressure on Ukraine, risking political instability in Kyiv, and not leading to any discernible change in Russian policy. Instead of trying to resolve an unresolvable contradiction, Western policymakers should acknowledge the starkness of the Minsk conundrum.
- An alternative approach would make the defence of Ukraine’s sovereignty the unambiguous premise of Western policy. It would view the Minsk and Normandy processes mainly as conflict management tools. In line with the priority attached to upholding Ukraine’s sovereignty, Western governments would meanwhile maintain support for long-term political and economic reform in Ukraine, using the EU/Ukraine Association Agreement as the anchor.
- This approach would also encourage the authorities in Kyiv to engage more inclusively with those living in occupied Donbas. Yet it would proceed from the assumption that the region should not be legally reincorporated into Ukraine for the foreseeable future. Finally, this approach would logically entail a lengthy stand-off with Russia over Ukraine – a prospect that many decision-makers in the West would find troubling and unnerving.
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Conclusions
Russia’s undeclared war in Donbas is Moscow’s latest attempt to limit the sovereignty of Ukraine, which successive Russian leaders have seen as the heart of their country’s self-proclaimed sphere of influence. Having annexed Crimea in March 2014, Russia launched a campaign of violent subversion in eastern and southern Ukraine. Using teams of insurgents (local activists and provocateurs from Russia itself), Russia tried to force Ukraine to ‘federalize’ its political system. The aim was to create pro-Moscow regimes in these regions that would, once reintegrated into Ukraine, enable Russia to control its neighbour from within. The Novorossiya project quickly turned out to be a crass misjudgment – ‘a conceit of Russian geopolitical culture’ as one observer put it.
96 Few locals sided with Russia. The readiness of many more to fight in self-defence compelled Russia to resort to increasingly open military intervention to save its proxies. Russia inflicted crushing defeats on Ukrainian forces in September 2014 and February 2015, yet was unwilling to pay the price that further high-intensity war would have exacted. Out of these contradictory circumstances emerged the Minsk agreements.
By almost any standard, this was a stunning failure of Russian foreign policy. The Kremlin pursued two objectives during the crisis of 2013–14. Its immediate goal was to prevent Ukraine from signing an AA with the EU. In this, it failed: the AA was signed by Ukraine and the EU in 2014
97 and entered into force in 2017. Russia’s second, more ambitious objective was to press Ukraine into the EAEU. Most unlikely at the time, this is virtually unimaginable now. The vision of a Russia-dominated regional bloc with Ukraine at its core – the central plank of Putin’s foreign policy when he returned as president in 2012 – is in ruins:
Russia’s goal of getting Ukraine to join a Russia-led bloc is further than ever from being realized. While many Ukrainians prefer to have good relations with both Europe and Russia, the events of 2014 have made that harder, and polling shows that, forced to choose, most would choose the EU. The war has soured the Ukrainian public toward Russia, and the fact that much of the pre-2014 population that was most pro-Russian resided in Crimea or the occupied Donbas, and cannot now vote, makes it harder still that a pro-Russian government will come to power in Kyiv. So the tension between Ukrainian democracy and Russia’s ambitions there is higher than ever.
98 This tension pulses through the Minsk agreements, which reflect two irreconcilable views of Ukraine’s sovereignty – the Minsk conundrum. Ukraine sees the agreements as instruments with which to re-establish its sovereignty. It demands a meaningful and lasting ceasefire, followed by the complete withdrawal of Russian troops and the return of the border to its control. Free and fair elections in the DNR/LNR would be held according to OSCE/ODIHR standards. Power would be devolved to Donbas, broadly in line with the countrywide decentralization programme, but without giving the region constitutional ‘special status’. Following reintegration of the DNR/LNR, Ukraine would make its own domestic and foreign policy choices. By contrast, Russia views the Minsk agreements as tools with which to break Ukraine’s sovereignty. It demands that elections be held in occupied Donbas before Ukraine has reclaimed control over the border, knowing that its proxies would win. An extreme form of special status would be written into Ukraine’s constitution, crippling the central authorities and turning the DNR and LNR into Russian-controlled mini-states. Ukraine would be unable to govern itself effectively or to orient its foreign policy to the West. Only then would Russia return the border to Ukraine’s control, although it is doubtful that this would actually happen.
Western attempts to resolve the Minsk conundrum – notably, the Morel Plan and the Steinmeier Formula – have sought to bridge the Russian and Ukrainian stances. Not only have they failed; they have heaped pressure on Ukraine and made a delicate situation there even more fragile. Nor have they led to any discernible change in Russia’s stance. On the contrary, Russia’s leaders have felt vindicated in their view, first, that Ukraine is inherently weak and unviable; and, second, that Western governments lack the spine for a drawn-out confrontation. Well-intentioned attempts at conflict resolution may therefore have made a political settlement that protects Ukraine’s sovereignty even less likely. Such episodes underline the need for extreme caution when talking about Minsk implementation, which easily merges with a presumption that the Ukrainian and Russian positions can be split down the middle. Rather than searching for an optimal point acceptable to all, Western policymakers should acknowledge the starkness of the Minsk conundrum – that either Ukraine is sovereign, or it is not – and stop trying to square this circle.